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By David Hafemeister

I,

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

Effectively Verifiable
.. ,.. n October 1999, the U.S. Senate declined
to consent to ratification of the 1996
.. .... Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Although the floor debate itself was so short as to
be perfunctory, verification concerns played a role
in the Senate's action. At the time, some senators
contended that the treaty's verification provisions
were inadequate to deal with potential cheating,
despite assertions to the contrary by the White House.
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Since then, the Bush administration has
refused to reconsider the CTBT, despite
widespread, almost unanimous interna
tional support for the pact. l
In the past year or two, however, there
has been growing support across the U.S.
political spectrum for Senate reconsidera
tion of the CTBT. A bipartisan group of
four senior statesmen, including former
Secretaries of State George Shultz and
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of De
fense William Perry, and former Senate

Armed Services Committee Chairman
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), have called for the
Senate to re-examine and ratify the treaty,
which prohibits the conduct of any nu
clear weapons test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion anywhere. 2
The Democratic presidential nominee,
Senator Barack Obama (IIl.), has also
endorsed this caU. In a July 16 speech in
Indianapolis, he said, "[W]e'll work with
the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and then seek its earliest

possib.le entry into force." The Republi
can presidential nominee, Senator John
McCain (Ariz.), who voted against the
treaty in 1999, said in a May 27 speech
that if elected, he would "begin a dia
logue with our allies, and with the U.S.
Senate, to identify ways we can move for
ward to limit testing in a verifiable man
ner that does not undermine the security
or viability of our nuclear deterrent. This
would include taking another look at the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to see
what can be done to overcome the short
comings that prevented it from entering
into force." How McCain might try to
address perceived shortcomings on the
verifiability of the CTBT is not clear.
The high-level calls for CTBT reconsid
eration reflect the growing recognition that
renewed U.S. leadership on nuclear non
proliferation and disarmament is needed
to shore up the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). The CTBT has long been
seen as a litmus test of the nuclear-weapon
states' commitment to fulfilling their NPT
Article VI commitment to end the arms
race and pursue measures leading to nucle
ar disarmament. As of Sept. 26, 2008, 180
states have signed the CTBT and 145 have
ratified, including all U.S. NATO allies. Iraq
is the most recent signatory. However, the
United States and eight other states, which
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are necessary for CTBT entry into force,
have not ratified the treaty.
Since 1996, only three nations have de
fied a de facto global nuclear test morato
rium: India, North Korea, and Pakistan. In
each case, the international community
immediately and strongly condemned the
tests. Moreover, international verification
capabilities have been tested and found
sufficient to verify compliance with the
CTBT. A particularly noteworthy example
occurred in October 2006 when the ex
tensive network of sensors in the Interna
tional Monitoring System (lMS) set up to
monitor CTBT compliance easily detected
a ,relatively low-yield (0.6 kiloton) nuclear
test explosion by North Korea. This detec
tion occurred even without the full spec
trum of nuclear explosion verification and
monitoring capabilities that would be pro
vided for under the CTBT. These capabili
ties include the possibility of short-notice,
on-site inspections.
When and if U.S. policymakers decide
to reconsider the CTBT, they will find that
CTBT entry into force would not only
strengthen the norm against testing, but
would increase the technical and legal ca
pabilities to monitor, detect, and deter vio
lations of the test ban norm. They will also

discover that since the 1999 Senate vote
on the CTBT, there have been significant
improvements in technical verification
capabilities:1 Together, these developments
mean that few questions should remain
about whether the CTBT meets the stan
dard for "effective verification" as set down
by top national security officials when the
Senate considered and eventually support
ed previous arms control treaties.

fication hearings, Ambassador Paul Nitze
defined effective verification: "[Ilf the other
side moves beyond the limits of the treaty
in any militarily significant way, we would
be able to detect such violation in time to
respond effectively and thereby deny the
other side the benefit of the violation."
Thus, cheating that could threaten U.S.
national security in a militarily significant
way must be detected in sufficient time. In
the case of a nation that already has nuclear
weapons, effective verification is deter
mined by the military significance of the
additionalnuc1ear-weapons capabilities it
might obtain by cheating, beyond those it
had before the treaty was in place.
During the START ratification hearings,
Secretary of State James Baker repeated the
Nitze definition of effective verification but
added a criterion: "Additionally, the veri
fication regime should enable us to detect
patterns of marginal violations that do not
present immediate risk to U.S. security."4
The intelligence community has a some
what different approach based on statisti
cal criteria. High-confidence verification,
in the community's view, is the ability to
detect 90 percent of the violations of treaty
provisions. For the CTBT, this means the
ability to detect 90 percent of nuclear tests

How Much Verification Is
Enough for Effective Verification?
In his Sept. 22, 1997, letter transmitting
the CTBT to the Senate, President Bill Clin
ton wrote that "our National Intelligence
Means, together with the Treaty's verifica
tion regime and our diplomatic efforts,
provide the United States with the means
to make the CTBT effectively verifiable."
A second attempt to convince a two
thirds majority of the Senate that the CTBT
is verifiable will depend in part on achiev
ing a clear understanding of what effective
verification means. The U.S. standard for
effective verification of an arms control
treaty was defined during Senate consider
at.ion of ratification of the 1988 Intermedi
ate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and
the 1991 START. During INF Treaty rati
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Figure 2: Identifying Low Yield Explosions- The North Korean Example
Seismograms of the October 9,2006 North Korean test show that nuclear explosions
can be differentiated from earthquakes. The graphic below depicts seismograms
recorded in northeast China from the North Korea nuclear test (top); from an earlier
nearby earthquake (middle); and from a small chemical explosion (bottom). The nuclear
test (magnitude 4, approximately 0.6 kilotons) can be distinguished from the earth
quake (magnitude 4) by the fact that the nuclear test has stronger primary waves and
weaker shear waves. The primary wave amplitude oscillates in the direction the wave
travels, whereas the shear wave amplitude oscillates at right angles to the travel direc
tion, such as a "wave" at a sporting event where people oscillate up and down but the
wave travels horizontally. The nuclear test can be differentiated from a two-ton chemical
explosion (magnitude 1.9) with a similar pattern of primary and shear waves by the
fact that the chemical explosion's seismic signal at this station is of lower quality and is
about fifty times smaller than the nuclear test. Combining seismic data with other tests,
such as air sampling for radionuclides, indicates that nuclear explosions below 0.010
kiloton yield (below 10 tons yield) could be detected in the region.
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at a determined threshold! yield without
regard to the military significance of any
particular violation. Medium confidence
implies 50 percent detection probability
and low confidence implies 10 percent de
tection probability.
When a violation is suspected, the level
of confidence in the monitoring data deter
mines which adjectives are placed in front
of "violation." The terminology reminds
us of the judicial standards of beyond a
reasonable doubt (actual violation), prepon
derance of the evidence (likely or probable
violation), and uncertain whether to pros
ecute (possible violation).
It is important to correlate these statisti
cal categories with considered judgments
of how yields and numbers of nuclear test
explosions in violation of the CTBT would
or would not affect the overall military bal
ance or put U.S. security at risk and how
it would affect the United States' ability to
respond to such cheating.

CTBT Monitoring Progress Since
the 1999 Senate Vote
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty bans
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer
space, and underwater and! is verified solely
by classified national means. In contrast,
the CTBT bans nuclear testing everywhere,
and it has extensive verification provisions.
These include the lMS, consisting of remote
sensors (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacous
tic, and infrasound);' confidence-building
measures; provisions for consultation and
clarification; and, once the treaty enters
into force, the pOSSibility
possibility of short-notice,
on-site inspections, as well as national
means. CTBT verification concerns have
primarily focused on possible cheating by
underground testing.
When the Senate considered the CTBT,
some treaty critics suggested that it could
only be monitored at testing levels of about
one kiloton. This misperception arose in
part from the fact that CTBT negotiators

decided that the IMS should be designed
to monitor nonevasive detonations above a
threshold of about one kiloton anywhere in
the world with high confidence. In reality,
however, actual test ban verification ca
pabilities were much better and have only
improved since then. Not only have IMS
monitoring technologies gotten better, but
so have the capabilities of civilian seismic
networks and national technical monitor
ing systems. 6
Indeed, a 2002 panel of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) determined that
"underground nuclear explosions can be reli
ably detected and can be identified as explo
sions, using lMS data down to a yield of 0.1
kilotons (l00 tons) in hard rock if conducted
anywhere in Europe, Asia, North Africa and
North America"? (see fig. 1). Advances in
regional seismology have provided addi
tional confidence. For some locations, such
as Russia's former nuclear test site at Novaya
Zemlya, the use of new seismic arrays and
regionally located seismic stations has low
ered the threshold to below 0.01 kilotons.
As an example, take the 0.6-kiloton,
North Korean test noted above. This nu
clear explosion was promptly detected and
identified from signals recorded at 31 seis
mic stations in Asia, Australia, Europe, and
North America, including 22 lMS stations
established by the Preparatory Commis
sion for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization. 8 The U.S. Geological Survey
posted a good estimate of the test location
five hours after the explosion occurred,
Seismic data from underground chemi
cal explosions show that far-lower-yield
explosions would have been detected in
the Korean region, as low as 0.002 kilotons
in fact, a factor of 50 below the OJ-kiloton
NAS monitoring threshold and a factor of
500 below the nominal l-kiloton threshold
(see fig. 2).9 The O.002-kiJoton threshold
is not applicable everywhere, but it is evi
dence that considerably lower limits can
be obtained than previously assumed,
particularly if there is a sufficient density of
regional seismic stations.
Regional monitoring is based on signals
that have traveled via the earth's crust and
upper mantle and have been recorded at
distances up to about 1,500 kilometers.
Better results are obtained with regional
monitoring than with longer-range or
teleseismic stations, which measure body
waves that travel below the mantle. New
algorithms, closer access, and seismic mod
els enhance the ability to improve location

estimates and discriminate better among
nuclear tests, earthquakes, chemical explo
sions for mining, or other phenomena, For
example, scientists have examined wheth
er regional data from seismographs located
at a distance of 500-1,500 kilometers could
shed new light on 69 (out of 340) Soviet
underground nuclear tests that took place
at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakh
stan during the Cold War but whose origin
times, coordinates, and magnitudes had
not been publicly determined, Using re
gional data, scientists were able to provide
information on all but two tests over 1 ton
(0.001 kilotons), This achievement took
place with seismographs employing old
technology. Newer technology provides
even more potential. lO
Moreover, regional monitoring has been
enhanced by the continued global expan
sion of the lMS. As of Sept. 26, 2008, 233
of the 337 IMS facilities were certified,
30 were operational but not yet certified,
36 were under construction, and 38 are
planned. Since 89 percent of the lMS facili
ties are now certified, operational, or under
construction, it is reasonable to expect that
95 percent of the IMS network will be com
pleted in about five years. Additional data
can be retrieved quickly from the 120-sta
tion Auxiliary IMS network and from the
vast Global Seismic Network.
The IMS has also improved the ability
to detect radionuclides that would be emit
ted after a nuclear explosion by an order
of magnitude. Forty of 80 radionuclide sta
tions will be able to monitor for particulate
and gaseous radionuclides, Radionuclides
from the subkiloton North Korean test were
detected in nearby South Korea and in dis
tant Yellowknife, Canada, more than 7,000
kilometers away.
Experts have also been able to lower
thresholds by comparing waveforms from
two separate seismic events that are in close
proximity. The small relative differences in
the waveforms are used to reduce location
uncertainties in seismically active regions
by factors of 10 to 100, as compared to
estimates based on arrival times of seismic
waves. This is extremely useful at former
test sites, and the technique is being ex
tended to earthquake regions.
A new detection technique, interfero
metric synthetic aperture radar (lnSAR), is
widely used by the United States, with its
four Lacrosse satellites, as well as by the Eu
ropean Space agency, Canada, and Japan,
InSAR can measure the earth's subsidence

(in many cases, to 2-5 millimeters accu
racy) after a disruption, depending on the
local situation. 1I InSAR is not used to mea
sure nuclear yield but rather to pinpoint
the location of the explosion to within 100
meters, In addition, INSAR can discrimi
nate between earthquakes and explosions
on the basis of the symmetry of the subsid
ence pattern. The detection threshold for
InSAR is less than 1 kiloton at 500 meters
depth for many locations if prior radar
data is available, which is now frequently
the case. Seismic data of a suspicious
event can direct InSAR measurements to
enhance the interpretation of the seismic
data, and InSAR can proVide
provide much better
location accuracy to direct on-site inspec
tions of an ambiguous event, Its accuracy
of 0,01 square kilometers is vastly better
than the CTBT's allowed upper limit of
1,000 square kilometers,

Evasion Scenarios
In its 2002 report, the NAS panel examined
10 evasion scenarios suggested by the U.S,
intelligence community, concluding that
"the only evasion scenarios that need to
be taken seriously at this time are cavity
decoupling and mine masking,"12 The most
commonly cited concern during the Senate
debate was cavity decoupJing, which is the
use of a cavity to muffle the seismic wave
from a nuclear explosion, No country is
known to have fully decoupled a nuclear
explosion in a cavity that was created for
that purpose, An explosion is fully decou
pled if the cavity is large enough to reduce
the nuclear blast pressure on the cavity wall
below a critical level (the cavity radius to
do this must be larger than 25 meters mul
tiplied by the yield in kilotons to the 1/3
power). The only fuJly decoupled nuclear
test to do this displayed a yield that was
reduced by a factor of 70. This was the 1966
Sterling test with a yield of 0.38 kilotons in
caVity,
a 34-meter diameter Mississippi salt cavity,
which had been produced from an earlier
5.3-kiloton nuclear explosion, In 1976 the
Soviet Union managed to partially decou
ple by only a factor of 12 with a test in a salt
cavity in Azgir. The 9-kiloton weapon was
too large to fully decouple in the 72-meter
diameter cavity, which had been created by
an earlier 64-kiloton explosion,
During the 1999 Senate debate, then
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.)
mistakenly claimed that a 70-kiloton explo
sion in a cavity could be hidden from [MS
monitoring, To do this would require a cav

ity with a 200-meter diameter (equivalent
to a 50-story building) with an area of 0,13
square kilometers at a depth of 1 kilometer.
No such cavity has ever been constructed,
and it would be essentially impossible to
construct one physically or to use such a
hypothetical cavity with sufficient secrecy
to hide a test.
The NAS panel determined that an ex
plosion in a cavity "cannot be confidently
hidden if its yield is larger than 1 or 2"
kilotons. The prospect that a country could
cheat undetected fails to take into account
that nowadays arrays of seismographs and
other seismic capabilities can detect and
identify many events that take place more
than 2,000 kilometers away with yields
considerably less than 1 kiloton, It also
ignores advances in regional seismology
(discussed below), One must also factor in
the fact that, for example, 90 percent of
underground Soviet tests at Novaya Zemlya
vented radioactive debris, as did 40 percent
of all Soviet tests.u Moreover, one must
take into account that, for a successful
clandestine test, the actual yield must be
limited to the level predicted rather than a
higher level (a "yield excursion"), This is a
particularly difficult task for new nuclear
weapon states, The panel noted that if an
inexperienced state wanted to reduce the
risk of detection, "it would probably try to
limit test yields to 0,1 [kiloton] or less."
Venting of rad ioactive gases is also a
problem for any state that might consider a
clandestine nuclear test. In fact, it is highly
likely that a significant amount (more than
0.1 percent) of radionuclides would be re
leased and then detected by the IMS, The
congression
congress
ionaa I Office of Tech no logy Assess
ment reported in 1989, for example, that
"since 1970, 126 [U.S.] tests have resulted
in radioactive materials reaching the atmo
sphere with a total release of about 54,000
curies, Of this amount, 11,500 curies,
roughly one-fifth were due to containment
failure and late-time seeps,"14 Venting from
smaller tests can be even more difficult
to contain, as the last four U,S. tests that
vented had yields of less than 20 kilotons.
Some scientists hypothesize that smaller
explosions may not sufficiently enclose
cavities with a glassil'ied cage to prevent
venting. Furthermore, the cavities may not
rebound sufficiently to seal fractures with
a stress "cage," making venting more likely
and the possibility
pOSSibility of avoiding detection
even smaller.
In the 1999 Senate debate, treaty op
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ponents pointed to a classified 1996 CTBT
National Intelligence Estimate and other
intelligence community documents that
made cavity cheating appear much too
easy by not properly taking into account
the six factors listed below. Even if each of

• Practically all the radioactive gases
and particles mmt be trapped. Ra
dionuclide venting is a particularly
serious risk for beginning nuclear
weapon states.

Fevv questions should remain
rellnain about
vvhether the CTBT lIneets
meets the standard
for ··effective verification·· as set dovvn
by top national security officials vvhen the
Senate considered and eventually supported
previous arms control treaties.

these tasks could be carried out with high
confidence of avoiding detection, there
would only be a cumulative 50 percent
chance of avoiding detection of one test
and only a 15 percent chance that three
tests could be carried out without detec
tion. Yet, it is unlikely that a new nuclear
weapon state even could do this well given
the major technical hurdles.
• Violators must be able to avoid
yield excursions to prevent a planned
clandestine test from being easily
detectable. All first tests, including
the early atmospheric tests if con
ducted underground, would have
been detectable by the IMS: United
States (1945, 21 kilotons), Soviet
Union (1949, 20 kilotons), United
Kingdom (1952, 25 kilotons), France
(1960,65 kilotons), China (1964, 22
kilotons), India (1974, 12 kilotons),
Pakistan (1998, 9 kilotons), North
Korea (2006, 0.6 kilotons).
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• It is necessary to conceal from satel
lites materials removed to create a test
shaft and cavity.
• Crater and surface changes due to
testing must be hidden from InSAR
and other technologies. The 1998
Indian and Pakistani test sites were
easily located in SPOT commercial�
commercial
images with 5-meter resolution. As
noted above, surface subsidence of
a few millimeters is observable in
many locations with InSAR.

• The cheater must avoid the detec
tion of weaker seismic signals by re
gional seismic stations and seismic ar
rays. With the advent of more seismic
stations in the world, this becomes
more difficult.
• The cheater must prevent the
detection through national means.
Human and other intelligence can
provide other information that
reveals test preparations. This in
formation can be used by the CTBT
Executive Council to authorize an
on-site inspection.

What Kind of Cheating Would
Would�
Matter?
Matter?�
It should be kept in mind that the principal
principal�
coun
risk that needs to be avoided is that a coun�
strategic
try under the CTBT could alter the strategic�
balance betwee.n it and the United States.
States.�
As noted above, the NAS study con
cluded that it would be very difficult for
states with less nuclear testing experience,
such as India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and
Pakistan, to meet the required conditions
to avoid detection by testing at 1 kiloton or
less. It is far easier to test in the lO-kiioton
range without a specific yield than to test
at a specific small yield. The NAS study
conduded that "Iclountries of lesser prior
test experience and/or design sophistica
tion" would also lack the sophisticated
test-related expertise to obtain "limited
improvement of efficiency and weight of
unboosted fission weapons compared to
1st-generation weapons not needing test

ing" from tests at levels of 0.01 kiloton to
1-2 kilotons. ls
The NAS panel also judged that "[s]tates
with extensive prior test experience [Rus
sia and Chinal are the ones most likely to
be able to get away with any substantial
degree of clandestine testing." For ex
ample, with difficulty, these states could
validate designs for unboosted fission 1
kiloton weapons in a cavity. Yet, very-low
yield tests by nUclear-weapon states, such
as Russia and China, should not materi
ally change the strategic balance by them
selves. A 1995 JASON panel concluded
that testing at 0.5 kilotons would provide
only minimal gains in developing a new
weapon design. 16 Moreover, at a mini
mum, several clandestine tests are needed
to change design parameters, improving
the chance of detection.

Net Benefit Analysis of Three
CTBT Situations
The NAS panel examined three global
situations: with full compliance to the
CTBT, without the CTBT, and with the
CTBT with evasions by China, India, Iran,
Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.
The NAS panel concluded that "[t]he
worse-case scenario under a no-CTBT
regime poses far bigger threats to U.S.
security interests-sophisticated nuclear
weapons in the hands of many more ad
versaries-than the worst-case scenario
of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime,
within the constraints posed by the moni
toring system."I?
Our discussion has covered only tech
nical issues in a world that is much more
complex in its behavior. General John
Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, examined the net benefit of
the CTBT by examining all aspects, includ
ing political ramifications for two worlds,
with and without a CTBT. Shalikashvili's
report suggested a mechanism for CTBT
ratification in which the United States
would "commit to conducting an intensive
joint review of the Test Ban Treaty's net
value for national security ten years after
U.S. ratification, and at ten-year intervals
thereafter. ... If, after these steps, grave
doubts remain about the Treaty's net value
for U.S. national security, the President,
in consultation with Congress, would be
prepared to withdraw from the Test Ban
Treaty under the 'supreme national inter
ests' clause."IK It is widely believed that
the United States will not test a nuclear

weapon because China and Russia would

The CTBT Is Effectively Verifiable

qUickly respond with multiple nuclear

Table I displays the monitoring limits for

not be detected, the cumulative difficulty

tests, leading to a new arms race. In addi

the various CTBT sensor systems from the

of hiding such a test would be consider

tainty for each task) that each task would

tion, the prevailing wisdom in Washing

2002 NAS repoft and from other sources.

able and almost insurmountable for more

ton is that the U.S. effort to halt nuclear

As discussed above, cheating under the

than one test.

proliferation would be greatly damaged if

CTBT would be far from simple. Even if a

the United States tested. Thus, the United

country tested in a cavity and managed to

States is constrained by the CTBT, while

carry out each of the six tasks identified

deployed at declared test sites to address

not gaining the full benefits that would

above in such a way that the states might

extremely small tests, but only after CTBT

follow from the CrBT being in force.

have high confidence (90 percent cer

ratification and then to be followed by fur-

Still, to provide further assurance, ad
ditional monitoring capabilities could be

Table 1: Tools for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Verification
The following array of technologies and assets provides capabilities to detect potential violations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). They could be further enhanced with various means of national intelligence and monitoring, such as satellites. Together, these
capabilities make the CTBT "effectively verifiable."
Technology/Method�
Technology/Method

Description

IMS Assets (When Completed)

Seismic

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded this
technology can detect explosions above 0.1 kilotons in
Asia, Europe, North Africa, and North America. Inter
national Monitoring System (lMS) arrays and regional
seismology can do significantly better.�
better.
Tests conducted in cavities can be detected if their yield�
yield
states�
is greater than 1-2 kilotons for advanced nuclear states
and at much lower levels for other states.
states.�

The IMS will use 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic
seismic�
stations. In addition, 140 Global Seismic Network sta
sta�
tions and more than 10,000 national and civilian research
research�
seismographic stations will produce relevant data that
that�
inspection�
can be used to monitor and trigger an on-site inspection
if so voted by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organi
Organi�
zation (CTBTO) Executive CounCil
CounCil�

explosions�
The NAS says this technology can detect explosions
with a few kilograms of explosive yield in the Southern
Southern�
Hemisphere and those explosions of less than 1 ton for
for�
oceans.�
all oceans.

The IMS will use six hydrophone arrays and five T-phase
T-phase�
monitoring stations.
stations.�

NAS says this technology can detect explosions with a�
yield of more than one kiloton for atmospheric nuclear
nuclear�
explosions (0.5 kilotons over continents), with the ability
ability�
to discriminate between chemical and nuclear explo
explo�
sions.
sions.�

The IMS will use 60 infrasound monitoring stations.
stations.�

The NAS says this technology can detect tests with a�
yield of 0.1-1 kiloton. This number has fallen substantially
substantially�
in relation to radioactive particles and noble gases, which�
which
are keys to Interpreting nuclear tests. The IMS detected�
detected
the 0.6-kiloton October 2006 North Korean nuclear test
test�
at a distance of 7,000 kilometers.�
kilometers.

The IMS will use 80 monitoring stations to detect par
par�
ticles; 40 of these detect radio-xenon. National technical�
technical
means (NTM) sensors on airplanes have greater sensitiv
sensitiv�
ity because they can fly close to the test. NTM sensors�
sensors
can also be placed close to suspected test sites.
sites.�

This technology can measure subsidence of the earth by
by�
as little as 0.2-0.5 centimeters in many locations. Using
Using�
InSAR, analysts can determine the location of a nuclear�
nuclear
test within 100 meters.
meters.�

The United States can use this technology with four clas�
clas
sified Lacrosse satellites. Canada, European countries,
countries,�
and Japan also sell unclassified data that can be utilized
utilized�
for this purpose.
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Any CTBT state-party can request the CTBTO Executive
Executive�
Council to conduct an on-site inspection.
inspection.�

On-site inspections measure radioactivity and geological
geological�
and other data.
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o
Aher the CTBT enters into force, states-parties could
could�
agree to locate sensors at known test sites. With such
such�
sensors, very low detection levels would be possible.
possible.�

Close-in sensors could detect seismic, infrasound, elec
tromagnetic-pulse, radionuclide, and Other data indicative
of nuclear test explosions.
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